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ABSTRACT. In the post-colonial era it is not an anomaly for serious scholars to 
consider the weighty question of whether there is a defensible African philosophy. 
In the space of arrested development due to colonial expansion and conquest, some 
scholars argue that the African subject has not yet rescued an account of a plausible 
philosophy. This is in part due to the fact that the African subject is schizoid – that 
is, trapped between the nascent colonial identity and the arrested pre-colonial 
African identity. As such, any attempt at resuscitating an African identity inevitably 
bears trace of the colonial ideology superimposed on the emerging African subject. 
On the basis of African gnosis (or deep, secret knowledge) and a call for indigenous 
knowledge systems to be held up by Africans for scrutiny – as the foundational 
focus – the core of this article focuses on critical agency and, more specifically, on 
how critical student agency might be imagined within the conceptual frame of 
critical pedagogy. By using the methodological approach of discourse analysis I aim 
to investigate not only how the physical, human and spiritual aspects of critical 
agency are revealed in African discourse and agency but, more appreciably, how 
they work and how this might inform education for the post-colonial subject in the 
local and universal space. 
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1. Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
 
The theory and method of critical pedagogy became acquainted with Africa 
through their originator, Paulo Freire, during the continent’s postcolonial 
phase. The political and social climate of the 1960s and 1970s ushered in a 
rapidly changing ideology, committed to the counter-hegemonic response to 
advanced capitalism. This historical period was characterized by social 
movements concerned with transformation, liberation from colonialism, civil 
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rights, women’s rights, gay rights, environmental issues, and anti-war 
movements. Against this backdrop, Freire suggested critical pedagogy as a 
process to address social problems through education, and as a means 
through which society could be transformed along inclusive or participatory, 
democratic lines. This seemed apropos, since the resistance movements 
chose to challenge the established, unjust and unequal order apparent in their 
world. In the majority of the African nations and other third world countries 
in particular, political liberation would be necessary to overcome the ravages 
and abuses of colonialism and imperialism (Santos, 2004: 37). Thus Freire’s 
theory and orientation show kinship with the lived realities of the marginal 
and disenfranchised in Africa and those of his native Brazil. This affinity is 
due, in part, to the bitter legacies of colonial and capitalist expansion, 
illustrating that countries under colonial rule (and extending into the post-
colonial period) suffered gross underdevelopment (Rodney, 1973). The 
dependence and underdevelopment of Africa (Mudimbe, 1988) are evinced 
in the poisoned fruits that capital and colonialism bear in the economic, 
political, cultural and social turmoil that has become deposited in the South 
in terms of what Santos (2004: 8) calls the North-South divide. 
Thus, to undercut capitalist ideology, Freire’s liberatory intervention 
began when he used reading and writing to aid thinking among economically 
disenfranchised slum dwellers. The critical dimension in his literacy 
approach was clear in that he utilized pictures to help illiterate adults 
interpret the problems of their lives by examining the causes, effects and 
possibilities of action for change (Freire, 2005: 9, 29, 33). By examining 
causes, effects and possibilities for change through critical literacy, a central 
theme in critical pedagogy is hoisted in the form of “conscientization,” 
which, by Freire’s definition, means the awakening of critical awareness. 
This critical awareness is used with literacy to heighten the student’s ability 
to deconstruct the capitalist hegemony of the ruling elite to achieve the goal 
of developing critical democracy, individual freedom, social justice, social 
transformation and a revitalization of the public sphere (Ellsworth, 1992: 
92). As such, Freire’s work with the poor in “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” 
(1970) is instructive on the effectiveness of critical pedagogy. Through his 
work, he determined that criticality involves the student or citizen being 
critically astute of social relations, social institutions and social traditions 
that create and maintain conditions of oppression; and being in a position to 
interpret it, critique it and change it. Consequently, Freire’s concept of 
conscientization and his devotion to the principles of critical pedagogy gave 
him license to extend his work to the African continent as a strategic literacy 
advisor in some parts of post-colonial Africa, viz. Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sao Tome, Angola and Mozambique (Freire, 2005: 12). Therefore, the 
motivation for this research lies in the basis of reimagining critical pedagogy 
in Africa through an examination of critical agency as a way to help address 
 74 
the main problem of how students could use critical agency to reveal the 
gaps within the current hegemony (in education, culture, media, capitalism 
etc.) that the dominant ideology has not succeeded in filling, and how this 
will inform critical theory as it manifests itself in South Africa? Now that I 
have outlined the theory and application of critical pedagogy, I will begin to 
align it more closely with, firstly, Hountondji’s (1983) conception of African 
philosophy; and secondly, with Mudimbe’s (1988) theory of Africa as an 
invention of colonial organization. 
 
2. Critical Awareness in African Philosophy 
 
Hountondji questions the universality of the word “philosophy” when it 
requires a preface or needs to be qualified by “African.” Could this mean 
that philosophy might mean entirely something different based on its 
geographical application (Hountondji, 1983: 56)? According to him, 
“African philosophy” is typecast in the literature as the subject of 
mythological exploration (by Westerners), yet it is necessary for us 
(Africans) to “retrieve it and apply it to something outside of the fiction of a 
collective system of thought but to a set of philosophical discourses and 
texts” (Hountondji, 1983: 56). To illustrate his premise that African 
philosophy (African philosophy, myth and reality at the time of writing) was 
viewed primarily through the lens of Westerners like Temples in his work 
entitled Bantu Philosophy, we appreciate the bias and ideology that may 
obfuscate any defensible account of philosophy in Africa when a Belgian 
missionary authors the text. Furthermore, the problematic yet unsurprising 
view that Temples holds of Africans in the Congo is that, for them, 
“philosophy is experienced but not thought because its practitioners are 
dimly conscious” (Hountondji, 1983: 56–57). Furthermore, the universality 
applied to Bantus is to suggest that, in plurality, there can be no hint of 
individuality or deviation from an imposed norm. Thus the black person is 
misrepresented as being ignorant, needing an interpreter to translate her 
thoughts, yet the interpreter sullies the account and formulates his own 
thoughts within the framework of white theoretical assumptions and Western 
models (Hountondji, 1983: 57).  
However, presenting philosophy in Africa as a caricature is predictable, 
given that colonialist ideology needed a psychological and cultural basis for 
anchoring the Christian message in the African mind (Hountondji, 1983: 58). 
Thus, Hountondji argues that, during the colonial period, philosophy in 
Africa was “conceived on the model of religion: a permanent, stable system 
of beliefs, unaffected by evolution, and impervious to time and history” 
(Hountondji, 1983: 59). Furthermore, Hountondji draws on Odera’s work in 
“Mythologies as African Philosophy” to illustrate the distortions and 
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deformation that arise when superstition is paraded as religion, and 
mythology is perpetrated as philosophy; then it logically might follow that 
dictatorships can be called democracies and pseudo-development can be 
passed off as development (even civilization). These distortions become 
fertile ground for ideological confusion, disallowing the dialogue, 
confrontation and reflection on history that is the hallmark of philosophy. 
And, as Hountondji proposes, this critical reflection and conscientization 
(Freire & Macedo, 1987) induce all new thinkers to be nourished from the 
doctrines of their predecessors and contemporaries by extending or refuting 
them (Hountondji, 1983: 63). In so doing, arbitrary over-interpretation of 
social facts is averted and critical thinkers begin to articulate and seek 
solutions to problems, for example by removing political obstacles that 
impede democratic liberties (Hountondji, 1983: 67–69). Thus Hountondji’s 
interpretation of a critical consciousness is echoed in Freire’s theorizing on 
the relationship between the oppressed (in this case Africa) and the 
oppressor (the West), where typical dialogical action is supported in the 
form of co-operation, unity, organization and cultural synthesis for problem 
solving in society (Freire, 2005). In direct contrast, the oppressor resorts to 
antidialogics, which is characterized by “conquest, divide, rule, 
manipulation, and cultural invasion” (Freire, 2005a: 95). Consequently, the 
methodological awakening of consciousness via dialogics excites an 
epistemological relationship with the characteristic trademark of intellectual 
curiosity, which becomes the instrument to comprehend the object of 
knowledge (Freire, 2005a). In this way people become empowered to 
transform their lived experience into knowledge and to use the acquired 
knowledge to unveil new knowledge (Freire, 2005b). 
Advancing Hountondji’s notion of philosophy, the further significance of 
dialogics is seen to foster an exchange between scientists (and educators) to 
reignite a scientific tradition by rearticulating themes, justifying them, and 
giving them a more secure foundation in an intellectual effort to know, 
understand, think and progress beyond the sensational formulations of a 
Western imagination (Hountondji, 1983: 61). For educators, this could 
translate into one of the most dedicated efforts to intervene pedagogically 
and ethically so as to help students discover that the social construction of 
suffering must be revealed in order to transform it (Freire, 2005a). In this 
way, of import to educators and students alike is the method by which to 
operationalize critical student agency, where agency is defined as the 
expression of the self through thought, action and becoming (Bussey, 2008: 
31–38); and wherein the critical agent is described as possessing 
conscientization, is empowered and engaged in the power of thought to 
negate accepted limits and to clear the way for new possibilities (Freire, 
2005a). So far I have attempted to articulate how philosophy as a critical, 
reflective (even reflexive) discipline and practice in critical pedagogy might 
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help clarify critical student agency. Now I shall relocate the focus to 
Mudimbe’s conception of gnosis against the backdrop of Africa as an 
invention of colonialist impressions, to investigate what effect the order of 
knowledge might have on critical student agency. 
 
3. The Invention of Africa vs. Critical Reinvention 
 
Mudimbe argues that colonial culture trivialized the richly complex, 
traditional and spiritual African frameworks and facilitated the social 
disintegration of African societies by swelling the ranks of the urban 
proletariat and destabilizing customary organizations (Mudimbe, 1988: 4). 
Consequently, the new (colonial) social arrangements and institutions 
ushered in unfamiliar and conflicting attitudes and values on the cultural and 
religious levels; and the resultant ideological confusion in unadapted minds 
might have influenced and justified the thinking that African modernity 
could be considered hybridized (Mudimbe, 1997). To illustrate the savagery 
and brutality of colonial ideology in the promotion of concepts such as 
“Sameness” (Western) and “Otherness” (African), literature and paintings 
such as the artist Hans Burgmair’s Exotic Tribe depict versions of human 
beings, the implication being, amongst others, that there are sub-species of 
humans (Mudimbe, 1988: 6). Therefore, by conceptualizing “Sameness” as 
Occidental, colonial ideology sought to exhibit how the “world must fold 
itself, duplicate and reflect itself in a link to form a chain so that things 
resemble each other” (Mudimbe, 1988: 6). Yet, remarkably unastonishing 
and horribly offensive was the depiction of “Otherness” in the paintings of 
Africans as “savage,” naked, in bracelets, with curly hair (read ethnic); or 
how African (exotic) bodies were assimilated into Western painting 
methodology, resulting in “blackened whites” (Mudimbe, 1988: 8). In so 
doing, difference became neutralized, but even more sinister was the 
reformation that assaulted the “exotic” mind, as it has to appropriate this 
colonizing experience and its terms of reference on an unequal footing.  
Further to this, the ideological confusion and host of paradoxes 
introduced through the colonizing experience mistakenly cast modernity as 
development, while tradition was downgraded to reflect a poor image of a 
mythical past (Mudimbe, 1988: 5). Even more telling in the racist 
modulations and methods of colonial organization is when difference is 
simply and unscientifically classified in terms of race and identity, which is 
to suggest that difference or “Otherness” has no ontological and 
epistemological basis outside of Western classificatory tables and schedules 
(Mudimbe, 1988: 5) Thus the unequal power-knowledge relationship 
between the colonizer and the primitive subject is understood on the basis 
that the latter produces “artifacts (not art) that is characterized as barbarism, 
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looked at with curiosity and labeled childish, simple, nonsensical and 
savage” (Mudimbe, 1988: 10). Under these terms, the ideological mapping 
becomes easy to detect: the domineering, civilized culture then concludes 
that men are born unequal and justification is given on the basis of the 
“African’s indolence, unbridled passions, cruelty, and mental retardation” 
(Mudimbe, 1988: 13). However, as Mudimbe elegantly points out, Western 
hegemony in an antidialogical and uncritical maneuver, neglects to account 
for the high civilization displayed in Yoruba statutory, Benin art, 
Zimbabwean architecture, Hausa statecraft, complex crop domestication in 
Sudan or sophisticated Dogon astronomical knowledge (Mudimbe, 1988: 
13). Thus, from the abovementioned accomplishments, Western 
“epistemological inventiveness,” and its accompanying “discourse on 
savages,” calls into question whether “Sameness” could indeed discover 
anything about “Otherness” (Mudimbe, 1988: 16) if it (“Otherness”) was 
already there, unless the motives were more treacherous and menacing than 
an exploratory or civilizing mission. Nonetheless, the capitalist logic of the 
colonial enterprise, which sought the domination of physical space, 
reformation of the native mind and integration of local economic history into 
the Western perspective, brought with it the projection of a particular 
consciousness to support its unsanitary mission (Mudimbe, 1988). And, in its 
employ, it used the unscrupulous and speculative theories appropriated from 
the social sciences (modeled on the more successful and reliable natural 
sciences) to brandish unscientific concepts such as white supremacy 
(Mudimbe, 1988). In this way anthropology could defend evolution, 
conquest, difference (biology, religion), and destiny in assigning things their 
slot by linking social facts to physical phenomena (Mudimbe, 1988: 15).  
However, critical consciousness or conscientization stops us from 
interrogating the link anthropology has with Western epistemology, since as 
a science (even a pseudo-science) it depends on a precise frame without 
which science cannot exist at all (Mudimbe, 1988: 18–19). Hence Mudimbe 
calls for an Africanist discourse and gnosis, which is not reliant on a 
Western model, to extract epistemological analysis and a critical 
understanding of the African past (Mudimbe, 1988: 23). Therefore the 
knowledge to bring about transformation cannot be sought in the depths and 
distortions of the “colonial library” (Apter, 2007: 31), as it is already extant 
in the gnosis of the customs, traditions, proverbs and institutions of African 
culture, seeking Africans to reinvigorate it for an African, rather than a 
European, audience. Here, the word “gnosis” is taken to mean esoteric, deep 
knowledge, self-determined ambition; largely, an investigation of truth, 
leading to enlightenment after experiencing many diverse forms of 
knowledge (Moore, 2014). The critical component of gnosis is evinced by 
the quest to prove every aspect of knowledge, both light and dark, which is 
contrasted with sheepishly accepting as truth everything we are taught 
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(Moore, 2014). Thus gnosis becomes an individual, intellectual journey of 
gradual training, gradual performance, a gradual progression, with a 
penetration to gnosis only after a long stretch (Moore, 2014). Simply stated, 
gnosis can be interpreted as the critical agents (who are different from 
objects) who know and act as creators of cultures that are their own in search 
of clarity (Freire, 2005a: 40). As such, gnosis stands in contradistinction to 
the mercantile ideology and political power based on the authority of 
scientific knowledge under colonialism (Mudimbe, 1988: 16). This 
alternative way of knowing and being in the world creates a chasm in which 
critical agency might be revealed as powerful and counter-hegemonic. This 
chasm creates the space for the “reinvention” or reintroduction of gnosis 
over “invented knowledge,” and student agency can be re-imagined under 
these terms, as traditional and spiritual frameworks might reveal how critical 
agency is operationalized. So far I have explored a critical understanding of 
African philosophy, as well as the critical dimensions of the order of 
knowledge and how gnosis might inform and deepen criticality. In the 
upcoming section I turn to critical agency and resistance, with a strategic 
focus to try to understand how theory can be unmade when critical, daily 
experience triumphs as it pierces and demystifies hegemony.  
 
4. How Is Critical Agency Operationalized? 
 
Human agency can be demonstrated through many faculties, so in this 
section the focus will be on how the power of the mind of non-dominant 
groups is analyzed thoroughly by Scott (1985: 29) in a study of peasant 
resistance. He argues that the intellectual sophistication evident in “everyday 
forms of resistance (foot dragging, false compliance, feigned ignorance, 
sabotage, character assassination, gestures and silences of contempt) make a 
shambles of official policies and muddles the hierarchical structure of the 
community” (Scott, 1985: 34). It is through quiet and anonymous acts of 
resistance that subjugated groups do not necessarily equate poverty with 
misery (since it creates a fissure for them to expect the charity of the affluent 
as a form of cultural decency); or to equate inequality with polarization 
(Scott, 1985: 63). Scott draws the reader’s attention to the role of human 
agency, which he believes is a huge error of omission in structuralist 
thought, since agency exploits the opportunities to confuse the homogeneity 
claimed by the established order (Scott, 1985: 310–319). To this end he 
invokes Brechtian forms of class struggle as the basis for the efficacy of the 
“Weapons of the Weak” (Scott, 1985: 29) because they require little or no 
planning; they represent a form of self-help, and they avoid any direct 
symbolic confrontation with authority or elite norms (Scott, 1985: 291). In 
this form of resistance, even theft is seen as counter-hegemonic, since 
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subaltern groups impose a compensatory tax on the affluent by appropriating 
that to which they feel they are entitled. So, when the subordinate groups 
fissure dominant ideology, they exercise their autonomy to develop their 
own understandings and interpretations of society, and this is given 
expression in their dialects; thoughts and ideas; customs; moral principles, 
religion; and politics. Scott concludes his analysis of the rupturing of 
hegemony by the underclass by allowing a penetrating appreciation of the 
view that hegemony always provides the ideas, means or symbolic tools of 
critique. While hegemony advertises a meritocratic ethos, it instead delivers 
favoritism and unequal access to superior education; while it promises one 
man, one vote, it serves corporate interests and allows the media to help 
dictate election outcomes; while it follows a capitalist economic system, it 
translates to recession and unemployment (Scott, 1985: 339). These very 
contradictions of hegemony allow non-dominant groups to betray or ignore 
the implicit promises of ideology. It is within the space created by these 
contradictions that human agency sets to work in challenging meritocracy, 
favoritism, inequality, democracy and capitalism. So the argument offered 
by Scott pragmatically reveals how human and social agency navigates the 
complex maze of understanding hegemony, seizing the vacant spaces created 
by it and resisting hegemony. As a result of this argument it becomes 
hopeful that students in marginal educational encounters inadvertently 
already may possess the agency to overcome the strictures of capitalist 
hegemony. The next question then becomes, if non-dominant students 
already possess the habits of mind to overcome the current hegemony (in 
education, culture, media, capitalism), why is it not incorporated to their 
benefit in their everyday and academic encounters? Thus, to help address the 
above question, the subsequent section will attempt to address the nature of 
the agentic force apparent in a methodological approach that might produce 
positive transformational experiences. 
 
5. The Methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
One might ask what resonance (if any) there is between critical pedagogy 
and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and what possible coherence they 
might have in counter-hegemonic methodology? To begin with, Freire, who 
conceptualized critical pedagogy as a means to unveil social inequality in an 
attempt to transform society more equitably, argued that education could be 
used for liberation or domestication. This means that education, from the 
point of view of superior power, is subversion and invites false 
communication, which preserves the status quo (Freire, 1993: 35). Similarly, 
Wodak proposes that CDA strives to make opaque structures of power 
relations and ideologies manifest via discourse analysis (Reisigl & Wodak, 
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2001: Ch. 2). CDA, in its turn as a critical paradigm, analyzes discourse in 
context to examine the extent to which language, power and ideology work 
to maintain social hierarchies, whereas critical pedagogy uses consciousness-
raising through problem-posing to oppose dominant power and transform 
oppressive situations (Freire, 1993: 8). In this way, critical pedagogy and 
CDA swear adherence to one another in that they look at text and discourse 
historically as barometers of social processes through a discourse-historical 
approach (Wodak); or a dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough) and its 
“embeddedness” with elite power; or a socio-cognitive approach (Van Dijk), 
in which texts act as vehicles for social change, all in the interests of 
obtaining more symmetrical relations of power (Forchtner, 2009: 4). 
Following Burbles and Berk (1999: 65), who confirm the belief that society 
is divided by relations of unequal power, they call for a position held firmly 
in critical pedagogy and CDA, which is that fostering a critical capacity in 
citizens is a way of enabling them to resist such oppressive power. And, in 
its commitment to exposing unexamined beliefs and assumptions in ideology 
critique, critical pedagogy shows much kinship with CDA as a 
transformative social justice approach. With the above in mind, the further 
discussion in the succeeding section will analyze how students could use 
critical agency to reveal the gaps within the current hegemony in education, 
culture, media, religion, etc. with a view to establishing how critical 
pedagogy might manifest therein, and what potential this holds as a socially 
responsive approach in relation to educational equality. To be more specific, 
the analysis will be conducted on three cases involving rituals and the 
discourses and disclosures that derive from these. In each case the analysis 
will investigate the emergence (or not) of unequal relations of power; 
whether there are any hidden power struggles (race, gender, class); and 
lastly, how language might be used to produce or reproduce social 
inequalities or, alternatively, how language might be used for social 
transformation. While I have thus far attempted to investigate how critical 
agency might be revealed via everyday forms of “silent” resistance, and 
sought to defend the methodological approach of CDA, my attention will 
now swing to Apter’s study on discourse and critical agency in Africa to 
broaden the understanding of the structural framework of power and 
authority so as to illuminate the dialectics of sociopolitical agency in practice 
(Apter, 2007: 4). 
 
6. Rituals and Discourse as Dimensions of Critical Theory 
 
Apter (2007: 6) warns that not all agency should be so exalted to be 
powerful and oppositional. So, the special interest here is to unlock the 
characteristics of human agency that illustrate ways in which every day 
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practices can be democratized. Apter (2007: 6–10) defines agency as the 
capacity for effective social action; it is transformative in capacity, context 
dependent and historically situated, and it culminates in both intended and 
unintended consequences. From this it could be inferred that human agents 
have the capacity to fight for justice; that this justice could bring freedom 
from oppression (in a democracy) at a specific time and place; and all of this 
action may or may not translate into equality. To bolster his claims, Apter 
(2007: Introduction) relies on a textured ethnographic study of discourse and 
critical agency in Africa that lays bare the important role language plays 
throughout the continent in elaborate forms of oratory, the specialized roles 
it creates (for example the King’s linguist), and the indigenous theories that 
account for the power of speech. In so doing, his revelations explode the 
“tenacious negations that have attached themselves to the continent in the 
form of being labeled: not civilized, not human, not rational, not moral, not 
white, not healthy, not even historical” (Apter, 2007: 1). Here the illustration 
is in the exercise of agency of Africans to challenge claims of inferiority and 
the injustice it necessitates when reduced to Western conceptions of 
ontology and epistemology. 
While colonialism strove to eradicate African “deep (hidden, powerful, 
protected) knowledge” that is activated through ritual, Apter (2007: 25) 
contends that:  
 
the critical power of indigenous cosmologies should not be 
dismissed since they transcend space, time, agency, and gender; 
and begin with the form of knowledge that makes ritual powerful.  
 
Human agency is revealed in the ways that priests, priestesses, diviners and 
herbalists are initiated into the secrets of their work and trained for years in 
esoteric techniques. In this way they can detect witches, cure infertility, 
recall the past, influence the future and empower chiefs and kings (Apter, 
2007: 25). Through their agency (practices), hegemony is unmade and 
remade, the status quo is reversed and transformed, and this creates the 
conditions for political transformations (Apter, 2007: 26). Similarly, 
Southern Bantu panegyric reveals human agency through praise poets when 
their statements criticize the very object of their praise (the king or chief) 
(Apter, 2007: 32). This act illustrates the agency of the tribal poet to tell the 
community the truth as he sees it, and provides the license to ridicule and 
criticize with impunity (Opland, 1983: 66–68). While I thus far have 
provided a prelude of how critical agency is conceptualized in ritual and 
discourse, what follows immediately below are the specific cases and their 
complementary analyses to investigate whether critical student agency may 
emerge from a study of ritual knowledge cultures. 
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7. Politics of Panegyric: Zulu Praises 
 
Following Apter (2007: 39), praise in the Zulu tradition “acts as an incentive 
to and reward for socially approved actions, and while they are usually 
flattering,” they may not always be that. It follows then that critical praise 
performs a regulatory function when it is directed against incumbents of high 
office, such as the chief or king, as we shall see below in the case of King 
Shaka. 
The single institution that appears to have retained relative autonomy was 
that of the imbongi, or specialist praiser. The political significance of praise-
singing in Zululand under the Shaka is thus underlined by the fact that it 
constituted the sole voice of opposition, albeit a muted voice, tolerated by 
the leviathan (Apter, 2007: 43).  
To illustrate the power of imbongi discourse, overt criticism of King 
Shaka is found in this excerpt below: 
 
“King, you are wrong because you do not discriminate / Because 
even those of your maternal uncle’s family you kill / Because you 
killed Bhebhe son of Ncumela of your maternal uncle’s family” 
(Cope, 1968: 110, lines 348–350). The historical reference is to 
the Shaka’s massacre of the Longeni clan (of which his mother 
was a member), which had ostracized and banished him when he 
was a boy. In terms of incumbency, the criticism points to his 
violation of basic kinship values. Shaka is wrong, not because he 
kills, but because he does not discriminate between kinsmen and 
enemies. Again, the criticism is a warning – nobody is safe from 
the Shaka’s deathblow (Apter, 2007: 43–44).  
 
The above excerpt illustrates the autonomy and power exercised by the 
imbongi in the face of the king in what could be imagined as a public space. 
It is noteworthy to mention that public critique attaches greater criticality 
and presents superior danger to the speaker, as it is easier for the king to 
silence his assailants secretly and avoid naked humiliation. Yet the 
confidence and impunity with which the words are spoken suggest that, even 
though Shaka is described as being a “leviathan,” the degree of power 
invested in the imbongi is significant, as one would rightfully anticipate that 
another (lay person) would face sudden death under different circumstances. 
Put another way, if the imbongi did not belong to the class of special 
praisers, he would be killed for challenging Shaka. The above facts allow us 
to make an ideological analysis on the basis that, although one might not 
consider Shaka’s political reign to be democratic, in the instance of the 
imbongi there appears to be an equality of authority in the spoken word, 
otherwise it would degenerate into mere positive praise without any hint of 
the confrontation, challenge and reflection we have witnessed above. 
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Furthermore, the ethical ideology on display leads one to believe that the 
imbongi does not consider his words carefully and establishes his behavior 
as being right, and not merely permissible, or else it would not be such a 
bold declaration before an audience. Additionally, the topic of his rebuke is 
the violation on the king’s part of socio-culturally accepted behavior. Here it 
could also be noted that the imbongi agrees that violence is acceptable, but 
he discerns that the king acted unjustly and unethically by violating kinship 
values. Of particular interest is the absence of what role women might have 
played, or if they were merely objectified: destroyed in conquest or 
assimilated into Zulu society (Apter, 2007: 41); if, in the absence of 
evidence that women were admitted as imbongi, the institution itself can 
then be regarded as unequal in terms of gender representation, which poses a 
problem as a form of reproduction of social inequality. In the light of the 
excerpts, while critical praise holds promise as a socially transformative 
element, I would venture to say that, if gender equality were considered, 
critical consciousness would be elevated exponentially. By this I mean that 
the king would have to contend with discourses on a widely expanded basis 
that holds him, and society at large, responsible for treating women on more 
equitable terms. Thus far I have labored to provide an account of “permitted 
disrespect” (Apter, 2007: 51) through the lens of Zulu praises (or dispraises), 
which appear to be male dominated. I now shall turn to critical social 
commentary provided by a group of elderly priestesses in the Oroyeye cult 
to explore dimensions of critical agency. 
 
8. Critical Discourse and Its Disclosures: The Oroyeye 
 
Apter (2007) introduces us to the political criticism of the Oroyeye priestess 
by way of Yoruba ritual associations, which are comprised of cults 
containing complex priesthoods with various grades of titleholders, ritual 
specialists and devotees (Apter, 2007: 68). In contrast, the cult of the 
Oroyeye is relatively simple, consisting of eight untitled women. As he 
(Apter, 2007: 68) describes it, they: 
 
invoke the power of their deities to remake and revise the body 
politic during elaborate annual festivals, the powers of Oroyeye 
priestesses are explicitly punitive. Their task as social critics is to 
expose, abuse, and, in the most serious cases, curse malefactors, 
mobilizing the force of public censure and condemnation to bear 
upon their misdeeds and reputations. The consequences of such 
criticisms vary, ranging from the immediate payment of a small 
fine to save face in response to mild teasing to full-fledged 
ostracism, exile, and death resulting from the most serious abuses 
(eebu) and curses (epe).  
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While Apter describes the stratification of the Oroyeye priestesses as simple, 
their social, ethical and political power is anything but simple. As illustrated 
in the direct reference above, these aged ministers, via the power of their 
deities, personify a somewhat legal ideology by socially exposing, abusing 
and cursing wrongdoers in the community. The ethical basis for their 
chastisement sweeps across class boundaries, as they do not discriminate 
according to status or office, which again bears testimony to their power and 
authority, as they themselves are not considered among the elite cults. Under 
any other type of logic their supposedly marginal status could be seen as an 
impediment, since they would remain outside of the protection of the more 
politically and socially powerful actors in the community. Furthermore, 
within Western frameworks their advanced age and gender would render 
them less agentic, yet within the ritual framework (imbued with the power of 
deities) they assume one of the most powerful positions. Additionally, the 
respect and autonomy they enjoy correlates with the magnitude of their 
influence, since they decide on the fate of transgressors – as negligible as 
paying a fine or as significant as death. Thus, their challenge and 
confrontation of those who infringe on the values and interests of the 
community demand transformation and penitence and carry with it the 
promise of redirecting unethical behavior. Ideologically speaking, their 
haloed ethical and epistemological positions provide political equality, if not 
indeed superiority, while their gender and economic status would have 
invalidated such superiority. In this instance, critical agency is invested in 
“unconventional” subjects through the authority of divine beings, but in the 
employ of the community for greater social cohesion through socially 
accepted behavior. Consequently, this act of agencyserves to highlight the 
issue that the priestesses’ criticisms are not merely for self-aggrandizement 
or the abuse of power, but for a greater social good. In sum, I have attempted 
to explore critical agency by way of an epistemological turn in which deities 
empower priestesses to expose and transform socially unbecoming behavior, 
Now I shall move to an analysis of sexual politics, when sexual repression 
vented through critical agency.  
 
9. Sexual Politics 
 
So far, Apter’s cases have provided a glimpse into critical agency in Africa 
through the vantage point of adults, but in this section I will advance closer 
to the goal of imagining critical agency by students, as the protagonists in 
the upcoming case are youth observed during a nighttime wrestling match. 
The town of Oroyeye (where the aforementioned priestesses also live) is 
divided into two camps: the Isaoye, who are indigenous, versus the Odoalu, 
who emigrated into Oroyeye at the time of the nineteenth-century wars 
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(Apter, 2007: 78). On the night of the wrestling match, the atmosphere is 
described as jovial but tense, as reputations rise and fall with each match 
(Apter, 2007: 78). Apter (2007: 78) explains that, “while the young men 
fought with their bodies, the young girls fought with their words: praising 
the winners with flattery and insulting the losers with abuse.” Even though 
the obvious intention was to provoke anger in the loser, the insults were cast 
in the spirit of a joke. Furthermore, Apter (2007: 83–84) portrays the 
charged ambiance that night as:  
 
In what was a gendered division of ritual labor, young men of 
lsaoye and Odoaiu fought each other to defend the reputation of 
their respective sides, while young women abused each other to 
defame the reputation of the opposing side. The sanctioned 
obscenities were clearly uproarious, the vulgarities unthinkable in 
any other public context, yet the game was played for real stakes. 
For the young men, victory meant a bigger reputation and better 
chances with the eligible young women. Meanwhile, the young 
women could vent their tongues and curse their rivals while 
surveying the available male talent. By overstating female 
sexuality, by permitting the impermissible in hyperbolic ritual 
discourse, and by disclosing that which is ‘normally’ repressed, 
young men and women could initiate sexual liaisons in that 
dangerous twilight zone of premarital experimentation.  
 
The complexity of the scene above is abundant with symbolism and paradox. 
With limited adult interference, the youth negotiate the match on their own 
terms through self-expression and autonomy. What might have been 
sanitized and ethical conduct in the context of an adult audience is 
abandoned and, particularly in the case of the young women, obscenities and 
vulgarities quickly substitute “ethical” behavior. Apter interprets the scene 
as male political competition through wrestling, running parallel to female 
sexual competition through song, whereas I construe it as a wider power 
struggle based on clearly defined age and gender roles. What would have 
prevented the women of wrestling the rival group of female residents? Thus 
not too much can be attributed to the women in relation to critically 
transcending gender roles; however, it should be conceded that the vitriol of 
their words might be seen as liberating and empowering (perhaps even 
brawny). And, while the men fought with their bodies and might not always 
win, the women would have constant success by debasing the losing males 
and the opposing females, further enhancing their sense of personal victory 
and liberation. Thus honorable mention should be given to the symbolism 
inherent in the scene, since what appears to be a wrestling match in reality 
may be far more: Firstly, both the indigenes and the strangers are fighting a 
historic battle over spatial inheritance and legacy, with each trying to 
 86 
legitimate their right to be there. Secondly, the same contention and 
animosities may transfer to inter-group social (romantic) relationships. In 
these terms, the youth are negotiating the same complexities and anxieties 
that the adults in Oroyeye might be trying to resolve. However, the 
sophistication in the way that the youth diffuse the inter-group tensions and 
rivalries by converting open rebuke and social sanction into jokes, and by 
converting violently physical fights to sport, reveals the relative 
sociopolitical equality between the groups. Moreover, the aggressive words 
in the songs of the young women illustrate their power through their choice 
and ability to seize opportunities that are prohibited under normal conditions. 
In sum, the youth in the above case confront, challenge and transgress the 
socially acceptable rules imposed by adults and critically express their 
political and sexual power as a sign of their autonomy and independence. 
Thus far I have sketched scenarios of how critical agency is operationalized 
in Africa, and now I propose to align each specific case to how critical 
student agency might be conceived of, as well as how these actions might be 
seen as counter-hegemonic and informed by knowledge of a ritual culture. 
 
10. Findings and Conclusion 
 
Firstly, the specialist praiser is epistemologically located within traditional 
Zulu culture and his critical agency is exercised when, in a public space, he 
physically opposes the king. His agency is activated by him using his voice 
to tell King Shaka how he (the king) violated kinship values. Whereas this 
critical action potentially could cost him his life, we can assume that he is 
emboldened to reflect critically because his position gives him such 
authority. Thus, as a critical agent, he informs a subaltern notion of how 
hegemony can be unmade. By virtue of his position he unapologetically 
challenges and criticizes the unjust actions of the king, creating an opening 
for the king to reflect and reconsider his actions and their potential effects as 
the potential erosion of culture. Likewise, critical student agency may be 
envisioned when students begin to question and interrogate problems in their 
everyday lives as they relate to unequal power relations or injustice. For 
example, students might criticize the Western epistemological basis for what 
is taught in school and call for greater representation and respect for African 
cultural, religious and scientific traditions, which they should stand prepared 
to criticize as well. In this way, Western cultural hegemony becomes 
problematized and students are induced to seek alternatives that provide 
greater clarity and possibilities for progressive action and transformation.  
Secondly, the non-dominant, mature female priestesses occupy a public 
space in their counter-hegemonic approach to social critique. Their critical 
agency is stimulated, as they use their spiritual wisdom and voice to deliver 
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pronouncements that expose, abuse and curse wrongdoers. The power in 
their critical agency has the potential to result in death for the offenders of 
the values and interests revered in the community. Additionally, their agency 
is assigned to them spiritually, yet is not used in a self-interested or 
egotistical way, but works in the interest of social justice. Epistemologically, 
this case could reveal to critical students the different ways knowledge can 
be sought, for example gnosis, which opposes standardized testing and year-
end exams as the marker or pursuit of knowledge. Further to this, the 
priestesses shatter many Western conventions in thought, action and 
becoming: they are subaltern, yet they possess the spiritual intellect to 
redirect even the powerful in the community. Also, the female Oroyeye 
ministers compare more favorably than women in Western culture, who 
occupy asymmetrical power relations, with males being most dominant in 
society. Thus, the priestesses provide a glance at how critical students might 
think and act differently when the media or capitalist relations of power are 
not allowed to organize their reality, but they themselves are at the helm of 
establishing the causes and effects of their problems in order to solve them 
and transform their lives. 
Thirdly, critical agency is on public display when the youth engage in 
sanctioned obscenities and acts of “violence.” In this case, the youth exercise 
their agency through their bodies and voice by way of their political power 
in the case of the males, and through sexual power in the case of the females. 
Therefore, in a knowledge system that allows youth to positively and 
effectively channel repressed emotions, student agency becomes 
emboldened to the point where students are given the chance to interpret and 
critique their own problems in order to diffuse physical and sexual tensions. 
As exhibited by the youth in Oroyeye, the intellectual sophistication of the 
women allowed them to use complex metaphors to challenge their opponents 
with the power of words, to interpret historical animosities, and to impose 
social ridicule. The youth culture as seen above negotiates meaning on their 
own terms and disrupts a hegemonic standard that sets up the media or 
capitalism to define youth and their needs. Similarly, critical student agency 
that refuses a capitalist ideology that commodifies youth and reduces their 
political power to purchasing power has the potential to allow critical 
students to become “beings for themselves,” rather than “beings for the 
other” (Freire, 2005: 72). As such critical students become positioned to 
experience political liberation, employ critical reason, become products of 
non-authoritarian pedagogy, seek political education, and be instrumental as 
student activists (Marcuse, 1964). Thus far I have endeavored to illustrate 
how critical student agency might be envisioned when seen within the 
framework of critical agency in African knowledge cultures. In the 
aforementioned examples of critical agency, the agents operated within 
specific and empowering, enabling cultural contexts, displayed criticality 
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and engaged in action that brought about transformation. As such, it could be 
imagined that the agentive student is atypical of the less conscious student, 
who simply accepts the status quo and continues to perpetuate it, and its 
inherent injustices and inequalities. 
However, Apter cautions Africans with the warning that it is necessary to 
overcome the colonial invention of Africa, and to recuperate the African 
personality and consciencism (Nkrumah, 1970: 89–113) through studies of 
decolonizing agency by way of resistance in poetic and prophetic voices of 
self-expression; and empowerment in ritual and armed struggle (Apter, 
2007: 101). In the light of the global expansion of capitalism, nationalism 
may soon replace universalism, and now begins the foray into one of the 
more profound questions regarding post-colonial identities that have as yet 
not recovered their pre-colonial national identities. In this article I have 
attempted to address the question of how non-elite South African students 
(as human agents) might reveal to us a sort of deep knowledge of lived 
reality that is empowering to the point of shattering colonialist, imperialist 
and capitalist hegemony to reclaim their democratic rights in the present 
time. As such, in this mammoth task we could depart from the point of view 
that colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, class, race and hegemony are not 
part of the natural world, and therefore can be labeled as social constructs 
and thus subject to human agents in terms of interpretation, assimilation and 
resistance. The implication therefore is that agentic students might 
hemorrhage destructive, socio-historically constructed definitions of their 
reality to fight for a measure of equality if provided with a specific context 
in which to achieve this, armed with critical consciousness and prepared for 
critical action that brings about transformation. 
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